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He argues that the engine driving this growth is the competitive pressure a well-
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One of the most thoughtful books in recent years on 
how innovation drives economic growth is Professor 
William Baumol’s The Free-Market Innovation 
Machine1. In it, Professor Baumol shows that over 
the past 150 years, per capita incomes in a typical free 
market economy have risen at unprecedented levels. 
He argues that the engine driving this growth is the 
competitive pressure a well-functioning free market 
economy places on firms to invest in innovation and to 
share new technologies with the firms that can use it 
most efficiently.
Intellectual property obviously plays a central role 
in driving economic growth through innovation. The 
protection of IP rights is essential so that companies 
and individuals can reap the rewards of their innovation, 
without which they would have no incentive to innovate. 
Protection of IP rights is also key to promoting the 
dissemination of technology; companies are unlikely to 
license others to use their technology unless they have 
confidence it will not be misappropriated.
For many years, it was widely believed that the 
intellectual property and antitrust laws had conflicting 
objectives: IPlaws sought to promote innovation by 
granting inventors a monopoly while the antitrust laws 
sought to prevent monopolies. Today we know better. We 
now understand that IPlaw and antitrust share a common 
objective and are mutually reinforcing: both seek to 
promote economic welfare and growth through the 
operation of free market forces. We now also understand 
that patents and copyrights, while differing in some 
important respects from other types of property,2 no 
more give their holder a monopoly than does a deed to a 
factory and that a free market cannot operate efficiently 
unless we protect property rights, be they intellectual or 
otherwise. Finally, we now understand that the antitrust 
laws do not seek to prevent monopolies, but only to 
prohibit conduct that allows a monopoly to be achieved 
or maintained through anticompetitive means rather than 
through “competition on the merits.”
This paradigm shift has led antitrust enforcers in 
both the United States and Europe and in most other 
countries with well-developed competition law regimes 
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to adopt to a more benign attitude toward intellectual 
property rights. The signal event in the United States 
was the publication in 1995 by the Justice Department 
and the Federal Trade Commission of their joint 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property3(“IP Guidelines”), the tenth anniversary of 
which we celebrate this year.
The IP Guidelines
The IP Guidelines explicitly recognize that “the 
intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share 
the common purpose of promoting innovation and 
enhancing consumer welfare.”4 In furtherance of these 
shared goals, the IP Guidelines articulate three general 
principles for the application of antitrust law to IP 
licensing. First, the Agencies regard IP as comparable to 
any other form of property for the purposes of antitrust 
analysis. Intellectual property, therefore, is “neither 
particularly free from scrutiny under antitrust laws, nor 
particularly suspect under them.”
Second, the IP Guidelines reject the approach taken in 
the early case law and state that, notwithstanding that 
case law, the Agencies will not presume that intellectual 
property creates market power in the antitrust context. 
Even when IP rights grant the power to exclude 
competitors with respect to a specific product, the 
existence of substitutes may prevent the exercise of 
market power.
Third, the IP Guidelines recognize that IP licensing is 
generally procompetitive because it provides a means 
for integrating intellectual property with complementary 
factors of production. Licensing permits more efficient 
exploitation of IP rights and benefits consumers through 
lower costs and better products.5 In addition, licensing 
can increase the incentives for innovation by making it 
easier to commercialize.
The IP Guidelines recognize, of course, that licensing 
arrangements can sometimes harm competition. This 
is most likely when the entities involved are actual or 
potential competitors and the licensing agreements 
facilitate market division or price fixing among those 
firms. Licensing agreements may also harm competition 
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if they condition access to needed intellectual property on 
the licensee agreeing not to deal with competitors of the 
licensee, thereby cutting off access to needed inputs or 
channels of distribution.
Key Outstanding Issues in U.S. IP Antitrust
Over the ten years since they were published, the 
IP Guidelines have played an important role in 
promoting more sensible antitrust treatment of IP 
licensing agreements. The guidelines have become an 
increasingly influential source of guidance, not only 
to the Agency and antitrust counselors, but also to the 
courts and to other competition authorities worldwide. 
Despite the progress that has been made, many key 
issues remain unresolved. This article will look at the 
five issues that are currently keeping the IP Antitrust 
community awake at night.
Refusals to License
As the IP Guidelines explicitly recognize, owners of IP 
have no general duty to license their protected property.6 
The federal courts of appeal, however, continue to 
disagree as to the application of this general principle. 
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit held in Image Technical 
Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. that an IP right 
is a presumptively valid justification for a refusal to 
share IP with others, but that the presumption could be 
rebutted by evidence of an anticompetitive purpose for 
the refusal. 7
In a 2000 decision, In re Independent Services 
Organization Antitrust Litigation, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, holding that 
subjective motivation is immaterial in assessing the 
validity of a refusal to license. 8 The court held that “in 
the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in 
the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the 
patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the claimed 
invention free from liability under the antitrust laws,” 
regardless of motivation.
Though the Supreme Court has yet to address this 
circuit split directly, its recent decision in Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v.Law Offices of Curtis 
V.Trinko,9 suggests that its approach will be closer to 
the Federal Circuit’s than the Ninth Circuit’s. In Trinko 
the Court reaffirmed the general right of a business 
to refuse to aid its competitors. The court held that 
any exception to this general right should be carefully 
limited. The Court described its prior decision in 
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.10 
as setting the “outer boundaries” of antitrust liability 
for a refusal to deal. The Court identified two limiting 
principles in Aspen: first, in Aspen, the defendant had 
discontinued a voluntary and therefore presumably 
profitable cooperative arrangement; and, second, in 
Aspen, the defendant had refused to sell its competitors 
a product (ski tickets) that it sold to the public generally 
even though its rival had offered to pay the full retail 
price, suggesting that it expected to be able to raise 
prices once its rival was excluded from the market. The 
Court also declined in Trinko to endorse the so-called 
“essential facilities” doctrine developed by some lower 
courts, which imposes “liability when one firm, which 
controls an essential facility, denies a second firm 
reasonable access to a product or service that the second 
firm must obtain to compete with the first.” Although 
the issue of refusals to license is not fully resolved, the 
risk of compulsory licensing has reduced by the Court’s 
decision in Trinko.
Presumption of Market Power
One way is which a IP holder may extend its patent 
monopoly is by conditioning a license to a needed 
patent on the licensee agreeing to purchase other 
unpatented products from its, a practice the antitrust 
laws refer to as “tying.”
Among the elements required to prove an antitrust 
“tying” violation is that the defendant must have 
sufficient market power in the market for the tying 
product to enable it to force the licensee to take the tied 
product. For many years, courts applied a presumption 
that patents and copyrights granted market power, a 
rule first articulated by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Loew’s, Inc.11 This presumption has since 
been challenged by lower courts,12 four justices of the 
Supreme Court,13 the IP Guidelines,14 and numerous 
academic commentators.15 These critics argue that 
while IP rights grant the power to exclude competitors 
with respect to a specific product, the existence of 
substitutes may prevent the exercise of market power.16 
Earlier this year the Federal Circuit in Independent Inkv.
Illinois Tool Works,17held that it was bound by Supreme 
Court precedent to adhere to the traditional view that 
patents create a rebuttable presumption of monopoly 
power.18 Because the defendant had not provided any 
evidence to rebut the presumption, the court found the 
defendant liable for violating antitrust laws.19 In June, 
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the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 
Federal Circuit’s decision and to decide whether these 
earlier cases should be overruled in light of the new 
economic learning.
Standards Ambush
Participants in standard setting organizations (SSOs) 
may be liable under the antitrust laws when they 
unilaterally abuse the standard setting process in a way 
that harms competition – a practice sometimes referred 
to as “standards ambush.” In a 1996 consent order, 
Dell Computer Corp., the Federal Trade Commission 
accused Dell of violating antitrust laws when it 
participated in a standard-setting process and twice 
certified that it had no intellectual property rights to the 
proposed standard, only to disclose after the standard 
had been adopted that it held a patent on the design.20 
As relief, Dell agreed to refrain from enforcing the 
patents at issue. 21 The FTC was careful to limit its 
discussion in Dell to the facts of the case – where there 
is evidence that the standard setting body would have 
implemented a different non-proprietary design had it 
been informed of the patent conflict and the participant 
had failed to act in good faith to identify and disclose 
patent conflicts.22 It did not impose a general duty on 
participants to search for and disclose relevant patents in 
a standard setting process, nor did it impose liability for 
an inadvertent failure to disclose patent rights.23
The FTC has sought to apply this notion of standards 
ambush in two recent cases. In In the Matter of Union 
Oil Company of California,24 the FTC staff alleged that 
Unocal violated antitrust laws when it used information 
gained from participating in the government-sponsored 
development of cleaner-burning gasoline guidelines to 
secretly patent the blending process for clean-burning 
gasoline.
An administrative law judge dismissed the staff 
complaint, but Unocal subsequently agreed to a 
consent order requiring it to stop enforcing the relevant 
reformulated gasoline patents and release all relevant 
gasoline patents to the public.25 In a second case, In 
the Matter of Rambus Inc.,26 the FTC staff alleged 
that Rambus had engaged in anticompetitive conduct 
by failing to disclose relevant patents and patent 
applications to fellow members of a SSO. Following an 
administrative trial, an administrative law judge ruled 
that the FTC had failed to show that Rambus violated 
the SSO’s rules or the antitrust laws, and the case is now 
pending on appeal before the full Commission.
The key issue in the case is whether the qualified 
requirement of disclosure articulated in Dell should 
apply to situations where the defendant did not have 
an actual patent, but only a pending patent application. 
Although the primary policy justification for disclosure 
of existing patents – the desire to provide SSOs with 
information required to weigh the costs and benefits of 
the adoption of proprietary technology as a standard – 
also applies to future patent interests, it may be weaker 
in the latter case. As one commentator has noted, in the 
case of future IP interests, the probabilistic nature of 
the information provided is less likely to prove useful 
for SSO decisions-making and the cost of disclosure 
of future patent interests is significantly greater to the 
disclosing entity.27
“Reverse payments” in Patent Litigation Settlement
Another important and unresolved issue in IP Antitrust 
concerns whether a patent holder violates the antitrust 
laws by making “reverse payments” to an alleged 
infringer in order to settle an infringement action. The 
issue has arisen prominently in the pharmaceuticals 
industry where pioneer drug manufacturers have been 
accused of making settlement payments to generic 
manufacturers in exchange for delayed market entry of 
generic drugs. The FTC has been extremely skeptical of 
reverse payments, viewing them as a “red flag”28 and 
objective indicia of intent to illegally share monopoly 
profits by delaying generic entry. The Sixth Circuit took 
an even more skeptical stance with respect to the reverse 
payments in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,29 
a case concerning an interim settlement agreement that 
included reverse payments and a commitment by the 
generic manufacturer not to market its generic product. 
The court found that the agreement was a per se 
violation of antitrust laws because it allocated the drug 
market between competitors.30
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a more benign 
view of reverse payments. In overturning the FTC’s 
decision in Schering-Plough Corp, the court sided with 
an administrative law judge’s factual finding that the 
reverse payment made by the pioneer manufacturer 
was not a quid pro quo for the generic manufacturer’s 
delayed market entry, but rather a bona fide royalty for 
licenses that the pioneer manufacturer had obtained 
from the generic manufacturer. 31 Moreover, the 
court noted that the exclusionary effect of a settlement 
agreement must be viewed in the broader context 
of patents, which “by their nature . . . create an 
environment of exclusion.”32 In this case, the settlement 
agreement was less exclusionary than the patent 
because it allowed entry of generic versions of the drug 
substantially before the patent’s expiration, suggesting 
that the settlement agreement did not violate antitrust 
laws.33 The Eleventh Circuit recently denied an FTC 
petition for rehearing and it remains to be seen whether 
the FTC will seek Supreme Court review.
Package Licensing as Patent Misuse
“Package licensing” describes the licensing of multiple 
items of intellectual property in a single license. While 
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it is conceivable that there may be circumstances in 
which such licenses may be anticompetitive, they also 
may serve the procompetitive purpose of facilitating 
the commercialization of new technologies by assuring 
licensees that they will have the right of use whatever 
patents they may need to manufacture products 
embodying that technology.
For this reason, IP Guidelines provide that such 
licenses should be evaluated under the antitrust rule 
of reason, which requires an evaluation of both the 
potential procompetitive and anticompetitive effects 
in order to determine whether, on balance, the license 
is anticompetitive. In its recent decision In the Matter 
of Certain Recordable Compact Discs and Rewritable 
Compact Discs34 the ITC refused to follow the IP 
Guidelines and apply the rule of reason, but instead held 
that a package licenses that includes both “essential” 
and “non-essential” patents constitutes per se patent 
misuse. The case is now pending on appeal before the 
Federal Circuit.
IP Licensing in the European Union
Competition law has been one of the successes of the 
European Union. The key provisions of EU competition 
law are Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome, 
which are the EU analogues to sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act. Article 81 prohibits agreement that harm 
competition and Article 82 makes it unlawful to abuse 
a dominant position. Like U.S. law, EU competition 
law was initially hostile to IP licensing, but has been 
following the U.S. in moving toward a more flexible 
approach that recognizes the procompetitive benefits 
flowing from such licenses.
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations
In May 2004, the European Commission published 
a revised Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
Regulation (TTBER)35 and new explanatory 
Technology Transfer Guidelines36 (“EC Guidelines”). 
Much like the 1995 U.S. IP Guidelines, the TTBER 
and the EC Guidelines should create a more favorable 
climate for IP licensing by moving from a highly 
formalistic to a more market-based framework for 
regulating technology licenses. 
The TTBER creates a safe harbor for bilateral 
licensing agreements in which the parties’ combined 
market share does not exceed 20 percent (if the 
parties are competitors) or the individual market 
shares do not exceed 30 percent (if the parties are 
not competitors). The safe harbor, however, excludes 
agreements that contain certain “hardcore” restrictions 
such as allocation of markets or customers, limitation 
of output, or restrictions on pricing. It also excludes 
agreements among more than two parties, agreements 
creating technology pools, patent disputes settlement 
agreements and non-assertion agreements.
Agreements that fall outside the TTBER’s safe harbor 
must be assessed individually under Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty. The EC Guidelines provide a general 
framework for assessing the legality of licenses 
that fall outside TBBER’s safe harbor. Agreements 
containing “hardcore” restrictions are presumptively 
illegal. All other agreements falling outside the safe 
harbor will be evaluated using an approach that is 
very similar to the U.S. rule of reason and requiring 
weighing the procompetitive benefits of the licensing 
arrangement against any anticompetitive effects 
to determine whether, on balance, the licensing 
provisions should be found unlawful
Compulsory Licensing
Applying Article 82, European courts and agencies have 
been less reluctant than their U.S. counterparts to use 
the antitrust laws to require compulsory licensing of IP 
rights. Less than four months after the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Trinko37 declined to endorse the “essential 
facilities” doctrine, the European Court of Justice 
applied that doctrine in IMS Health Inc. v. NDC Health 
Corporation38 to compel the licensing of IP rights. 
In the ECJ case, IMS Health Inc. had copyrighted a 
geographical breakdown called a “brick structure” 
for processing data received from pharmaceutical 
wholesalers. When a competitor, NDC, tried using a 
similar structure to provide data collection services, 
IMS sued for copyright infringement. NDC, responded 
by accusing IMS of violating EU competition law by 
refusing to license its proprietary brick structure to 
NDC. Following a line of cases that includes Magill39 
and Bronner,40 the ECJ held that if the brick structure 
is “indispensable” to such data collection services, it 
is a violation of EU law to refuse to license the brick 
structure, if the following conditions are met: the 
prospective licensee intends to offer new products or 
services not offered by the copyright owner and for 
which there is a potential consumer demand; the refusal 
is not justified by objective considerations; and the 
refusal is such as to reserve to the copyright owner the 
entire market (in this case the supply of data on sales of 
pharmaceutical products in the Germany) by eliminating 
all competition in that market.
A potentially even larger problem looms in 
China, which is preparing to adopt an Anti-
Monopoly Law. These provisions would grant 
Chinese regulators extensive power to pursue 
compulsory licensing. The draft law also pro-
poses treating excessive pricing as an abuse 
of dominance, which may open the door to 
regulating royalties in IP licenses.
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There is significant ambiguity in the standard adopted 
by the ECJ. For example, it is unclear what kind of proof 
is required to show intent that alicensee “intends” to 
offer a product. Likewise, the level of novelty required 
to satisfy the “new product” standard is ambiguous. 
Interpretation of such terms by agencies and courts 
will determine whether the frequency of compulsory 
licensing actually increases in the wake of the IMS 
decision. The court’s decision does, however, leave 
open the door to compulsory licensing, especially where 
de facto industry standards are present. Ultimately, 
IMS demonstrates that despite the movement toward a 
climate more favorable to IP licensing and convergence 
with U.S. IP Antitrust, European competition law is still 
decidedly less favorable to the rights of IP owners than 
U.S. antitrust law.
IP Licensing in Developing Countries
A key to economic growth in developing countries 
is access to technology. Adoption of new technology 
increases economic productivity, facilitates the growth 
of new industries, and increases the standard of 
living. A primary conduit for this valuable technology 
transfer is IP licensing. In the early 1990s, inadequate 
protection of IP rights and the associated risk of 
piracy, risked slowing down licensing by making the 
holders of IPrights reluctant to license to licensees in 
developing countries. To assuage the fear of IP holders 
and encourage technology transfer, the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(TRIPS) was reached in 1994. TRIPS, which applies 
to all members of the WTO, sets out minimum 
standards of protection that each country must provide 
to IP rights. Under the agreement, patent rights are 
enforced regardless of whether the products are foreign 
or domestic. TRIPS also expands IP rights to areas 
previously unprotected in most developing countries, 
such as computer programs and pharmaceuticals.
Despite TRIPS, dangers still remain for IP holders. One 
risk is that developing countries may misuse their newly 
enacted competition laws to compel licensing on terms 
that favor local industry. A recent example is a July 
2004 decision of the Taiwanese Intellectual Property 
Office (TIPO) in which the Taiwanese government 
forced Philips to license CD-R technology to Taiwanese 
competitors at lower than market price.41 TIPO based 
its decision on a provision of Taiwan’s Patent Law that 
permits compulsory licensing where the applicant is 
unable “to reach a licensing agreement with the patentee 
concerned under reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions within a reasonable period of time.”42
A potentially even larger problem looms in China, 
which is preparing to adopt an Anti-Monopoly Law. 
The most recent draft of the law released in April 
2005 contains a strong essential facilities provision,43 
as well as an article providing that a business in a 
dominant market position may not, “without valid 
reasons,” refuse to sell its products.44 Together, these 
provisions would grant Chinese regulators extensive 
power to pursue compulsory licensing. The draft law 
also proposes treating excessive pricing as an abuse 
of dominance, which may open the door to regulating 
royalties in IP licenses. As the ABA recently concluded, 
in its current form China’s Anti-Monopoly law has the 
potential to “discourage investment and innovation by 
undertakings and therefore could harm competition and 
consumers.”45
Faced with these risks, the IP Antitrust community 
needs to look for creative ways to promote convergence 
in the application of competition laws to intellectual 
property along the lines of the U.S. IP Guidelines and 
the EU TTBER. One possible path forwardinvolves 
the International Competition Network (“ICN”), an 
informal network for competition authorities worldwide 
that promotes effective antitrust regulation. Since its 
inception in 2002, the ICN has played an important role 
in promoting international cooperation and convergence 
in antitrust enforcement through working groups in 
such critical areas as cartels and merger control. Given 
the central importance of IP licensing to international 
economic development, the ICN should seriously 
consider creating an IP working group. An ICN IP 
working group could help assure that competition laws 
are enforced by all countries in a way that properly 
respects the critical role intellectual property rights and 
licensing play in keeping the free market innovation 
machine working. o
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